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作者：Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：A group of n quacks plays a price-competition game, facing a continuum of patients who recover with probability alpha, whether they acquire a quack's treatment. If patients chose rationally, the market would be inactive. I assume, however, that patients choose according to a boundedly rational procedure, which reflects anecdotal reasoning. This element of bounded rationality has significant implications. The market for quacks is active, and patients suffer a welfare loss which behaves non-mono...
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作者：Elliott, Graham; Mueller, Ulrich K.
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：There are a large number of tests for instability or breaks in coefficients in regression models designed for different possible departures from the stable model. We make two contributions to this literature. First, we consider a large class of persistent breaking processes that lead to asymptotically equivalent efficient tests. Our class allows for many or relatively few breaks, clustered breaks, regularly occurring breaks, or smooth transitions to changes in the regression coefficients. Thus...
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作者：Foellmi, Reto; Zweimueller, Josef
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：We introduce non-homothetic preferences into an innovation-based growth model and study how income and wealth inequality affect economic growth. We identify a (positive) price effect-where increasing inequality allows innovators to charge higher prices and (negative) market-size effects-with higher inequality implying smaller markets for new goods and/or a slower transition of new goods into mass markets. It turns out that price effects dominate market-size effects. We also show that a redistr...
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作者：Jackson, Matthew O.; Kremer, Ilan
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Stanford University
摘要：We examine the relevance of an auction format in a competitive environment by comparing uniform and discriminatory price auctions with many bidders in a private values setting. We show that if the number of objects for sale is small relative to the number of bidders, then all equilibria of both auctions are approximately efficient and lead to approximately the same revenue. When the number of objects for sale is proportional to the number of bidders, then the particulars of the auction format ...
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作者：Lalive, Rafael; Van Ours, Jan; Zweimueller, Josef
作者单位：University of Zurich; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper studies how changes in the two key parameters of unemployment insurance-the benefit replacement rate (RR) and the potential benefit duration (PBD)-affect the duration of unemployment. To identify such an effect we exploit a policy change introduced in 1989 by the Austrian government, which affected various unemployed workers differently: a first group experienced an increase in RR; a second group experienced an extension of PBD; a third group experienced both a higher RR and a longe...
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作者：McAdams, David
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed-strategy equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected payment equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standard expected surplus/revenue analysis, there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies.
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作者：Dekel, Eddie; Feinberg, Yossi
作者单位：Northwestern University; Stanford University
摘要：We propose a method to test a prediction of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian, non-parametric setting, a predicted distribution is tested using a realization of the stochastic process. A test associates a set of realizations for each predicted distribution, on which the prediction passes, so that if there are no type I errors, a prediction assigns probability 1 to its test set. Nevertheless, these test sets can be small, in the sense that most distributions assign it ...
