-
作者：Guembel, Alexander; Sussman, Oren
作者单位：University of Oxford; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We develop a theory of sovereign borrowing where default penalties are not implementable. We show that when debt is held by both domestic and foreign agents, the median voter might have an interest in serving it. Our theory has important practical implications regarding (a) the role of financial intermediaries in sovereign lending, (b) the effect of capital flows on price volatility including the possible overvaluation of debt to the point that the median voter is priced out of the market, and...
-
作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University
摘要：A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages lead to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile. In an interdependent-value environment with single-crossing preferences, we identify a contraction property on the preferences which together with strict ex post incentive compatibility is sufficient to guarantee robust implementation in the dir...
-
作者：Dionne, Georges; St-Amour, Pascal; Vencatachellum, Desire
作者单位：University of Lausanne
摘要：Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection. This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common values suggests that when an informed participant is known to be active, uninformed bidders will be more aggressive and the selling price will be higher. We conjecture that observable family links between buyer and seller entailed superior information and find a strong price premium when a ...
-
作者：Kartik, Navin
作者单位：Columbia University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：I study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed Receiver and an informed but upwardly biased Sender. The Sender bears a cost of lying, or more broadly, of misrepresenting his private information. The main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment, where the Sender (almost) always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information. Regardless of the intensity of lying cost, there is incomplete separation, with some pooling on th...
-
作者：Li, Tong; Zheng, Xiaoyong
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; North Carolina State University
摘要：Motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the Texas Department of Transportation (TDoT), we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry. Our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications. For the first time, we show that even within an independent private value paradigm, as the number of potential bidders increases, bidders' equilibrium bidding behaviour can become less aggressive, and the expected procureme...
-
作者：Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Patacchini, Eleonora; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Sapienza University Rome; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Stockholm University
摘要：We develop a model that shows that, at the Nash equilibrium, the outcome of each individual embedded in a network is proportional to his/her Katz-Bonacich centrality measure. This measure takes into account both direct and indirect friends of each individual, but puts less weight to his/her distant friends. We then bring the model to the data using a very detailed dataset of adolescent friendship networks. We show that, after controlling for observable individual characteristics and unobservab...
-
作者：Offerman, Theo; Sonnemans, Joep; Van de Kuilen, Gijs; Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tilburg University; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：Proper scoring rules provide convenient and highly efficient tools for incentive-compatible elicitations of subjective beliefs. As traditionally used, however, they are valid only under expected value maximization. This paper shows how they can be generalized to modern (non-expected utility) theories of risk and ambiguity, yielding mutual benefits: users of scoring rules can benefit from the empirical realism of non-expected utility, and analysts of ambiguity attitudes can benefit from efficie...
-
作者：Bolton, Patrick; Faure-Grimaud, Antoine
作者单位：Columbia University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We propose a model of costly decision making based on time-costs of deliberating current and future decisions. We model an individual decision-maker's thinking process as a thought-experiment that takes time, and lets the decision maker 'think ahead' about future decision problems in yet unrealized states of nature. By formulating an intertemporal, state-contingent, planning problem which may involve costly deliberation in every state of nature, and by letting the decision maker deliberate ahe...
