Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Guembel, Alexander; Sussman, Oren
署名单位：
University of Oxford; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0034-6527
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00542.x
发表日期：
2009
页码：
1297-1320
关键词：
摘要：
We develop a theory of sovereign borrowing where default penalties are not implementable. We show that when debt is held by both domestic and foreign agents, the median voter might have an interest in serving it. Our theory has important practical implications regarding (a) the role of financial intermediaries in sovereign lending, (b) the effect of capital flows on price volatility including the possible overvaluation of debt to the point that the median voter is priced out of the market, and (c) debt restructuring where creditors are highly dispersed.
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