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作者：Unver, M. Utku
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：We study how barter exchanges should be conducted through a centralized mechanism in a dynamically evolving agent pool with time-and compatibility-based preferences. We derive the dynamically efficient two-way and multi-way exchange mechanisms that maximize total discounted exchange surplus. Recently several live-donor kidney exchange programmes were established to swap incompatible donors of end-stage kidney disease patients. Since kidney exchange can be modelled as a special instance of our ...
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作者：Beaudry, Paul; Francois, Patrick
作者单位：Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); University of British Columbia; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Why don't all countries converge rapidly to the use of most efficient or best practice technologies? Micro level studies suggest managerial skills play a key role in the adoption of modern technologies. In this paper we model the interactive process between on-the-job managerial skill acquisition and the adoption of modern technology. We use the model to illustrate why some countries develop managerial skills quickly and adopt best practice technologies, while others stay backwards. The model ...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Lorenzoni, Guido
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a model where aggregate fluctuations are driven by the private sector's uncertainty about the economy's fundamentals. Information on aggregate productivity is dispersed across agents and there are two aggregate shocks: a standard productivity shock and a noise shock affecting public beliefs about aggregate productivity. Neither the central bank nor individual agents can distinguish the two shocks when they are realized. Despite the lack of superior...
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作者：Galeotti, Andrea; Goyal, Sanjeev; Jackson, Matthew O.; Vega-Redondo, Fernando; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Cambridge; Stanford University; The Santa Fe Institute; European University Institute; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player's well-being depends on his or her own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbours. We provide a framework to analyse such strategic interactions when neighbourhood structure, modelled in terms of an underlying network of connections, affects payoffs. In our framework, individuals are partially informed about the structure of the social network. The introduction of incomplete information all...
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作者：Gautier, Pieter A.; Teulings, Coen N.; Van Vuuren, Aico
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper characterizes the equilibrium for a large class of search models with two-sided heterogeneity and on-the-job search. Besides the well-known congestion externalities, we show that on-the-job search in combination with monopsonistic wage setting without commitment creates a business-stealing externality. In the absence of congestion effects, this leads to excessive vacancy creation. Under wage setting with commitment this externality is absent because when posting a wage, firms take i...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Morton, Rebecca B.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：Princeton University; New York University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter's curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on pivotal voter models. Our experiment controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the distribution of preferences and other theoretically relevant parameters. The design varies the share of partisan voters and the prior belief about a payoff relevant state of the world. Our results support the equilib...
