Network Games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Galeotti, Andrea; Goyal, Sanjeev; Jackson, Matthew O.; Vega-Redondo, Fernando; Yariv, Leeat
署名单位：
University of Essex; University of Cambridge; Stanford University; The Santa Fe Institute; European University Institute; California Institute of Technology
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0034-6527
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00570.x
发表日期：
2010
页码：
218-244
关键词：
摘要：
In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player's well-being depends on his or her own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbours. We provide a framework to analyse such strategic interactions when neighbourhood structure, modelled in terms of an underlying network of connections, affects payoffs. In our framework, individuals are partially informed about the structure of the social network. The introduction of incomplete information allows us to provide general results characterizing how the network structure, an individual's position within the network, the nature of games (strategic substitutes vs. complements and positive vs. negative externalities) and the level of information shape individual behaviour and payoffs.
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