-
作者：Flory, Jeffrey A.; Leibbrandt, Andreas; List, John A.
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Claremont McKenna College; Claremont Graduate University; Monash University; University of Chicago
摘要：An important line of research using laboratory experiments has provided a new potential reason for gender imbalances in labour markets: men are more competitively inclined than women. Whether, and to what extent, gender differences in attitudes toward competition lead to differences in naturally occurring labour markets remains an open question. To examine this, we run a natural field experiment on job-entry decisions where we randomize almost 9000 job-seekers into different compensation regim...
-
作者：Georgiadis, George
作者单位：Boston University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：I study a dynamic problem in which a group of agents collaborate over time to complete a project. The project progresses at a rate that depends on the agents' efforts, and it generates a pay-off upon completion. I show that agents work harder the closer the project is to completion, and members of a larger team work harder than members of a smaller team-both individually and on aggregate-if and only if the project is sufficiently far from completion. I apply these results to determine the opti...
-
作者：Grubb, Michael D.
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：For many goods and services such as electricity, health care, cellular phone service, debit-card transactions, or those sold with loyalty discounts, the price of the next unit of service depends on past usage. As a result, consumers who are inattentive to their past usage but are aware of contract terms may remain uncertain about the price of the next unit. I develop a model of inattentive consumption, derive equilibrium pricing when consumers are inattentive, and evaluate bill-shock regulatio...
-
作者：Caliendo, Lorenzo; Parro, Fernando
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We build into a Ricardian model sectoral linkages, trade in intermediate goods, and sectoral heterogeneity in production to quantify the trade and welfare effects from tariff changes. We also propose a new method to estimate sectoral trade elasticities consistent with any trade model that delivers a multiplicative gravity equation. We apply our model and use our estimated elasticities to identify the impact of NAFTA's tariff reductions. We find that Mexico's welfare increases by 1.31%, U.S.'s ...
-
作者：Handbury, Jessie; Weinstein, David E.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：This article uses detailed barcode data on purchase transactions by households in 49 U.S. cities to calculate the first theoretically founded urban price index. In doing so, we overcome a large number of problems that have plagued spatial price index measurement. We identify two important sources of bias. Heterogeneity bias arises from comparing different goods in different locations, and variety bias arises from not correcting for the fact that some goods are unavailable in some locations. El...
-
作者：Gandhi, Amit; Serrano-Padial, Ricardo
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This article studies belief heterogeneity in a benchmark competitive asset market: a market for Arrow-Debreu securities. We show that differences in agents' beliefs lead to a systematic pricing pattern, the favourite-longshot bias (FLB): securities with a low-pay-out probability are overpriced, whereas securities with high probability pay-out are underpriced. We apply demand estimation techniques to betting market data, and find that the observed FLB is explained by a two-type population consi...
-
作者：Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M.
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Bayreuth; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Munich
摘要：We propose a theory of inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and losses of the renegotiated transaction. We show that loss aversion makes the renegotiated outcome sticky and materially inefficient. The theory has important implications for the optimal design of long-term contr...
-
作者：Cho, In-Koo; Kasa, Kenneth
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; Hanyang University; Simon Fraser University
摘要：This paper studies adaptive learning with multiple models. An agent operating in a self-referential environment is aware of potential model misspecification, and tries to detect it, in real-time, using an econometric specification test. If the current model passes the test, it is used to construct an optimal policy. If it fails the test, a new model is selected. As the rate of coefficient updating decreases, one model becomes dominant, and is used almost always. Dominant models can be characte...
-
作者：Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This article analyses contractual situations between many principals and many agents. The agents have private information, and the principals take actions. Principals have the ability to contract not only on the reports of the agents but also on the contracts offered by other principals. Contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. The main result of the article is a characterization of the allocations that can be implemented as equilibria in our contracting game. We then r...
-
作者：Rhodes, Andrew
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study the pricing behaviour of a multiproduct firm, when consumers must pay a search cost to learn its prices. Equilibrium prices are high, because consumers understand that visiting a store exposes them to a hold-up problem. However, a firm with more products charges lower prices, because it attracts consumers who are more price sensitive. Similarly, when a firm advertises a low price on one product, consumers rationally expect it to charge somewhat lower prices on its other products as we...
