Projects and Team Dynamics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Georgiadis, George
• 署名单位: Boston University; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdu031
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 187-218
• 关键词: public-goods; private provision; INFORMATION; gradualism; efficient; pay

摘要

I study a dynamic problem in which a group of agents collaborate over time to complete a project. The project progresses at a rate that depends on the agents' efforts, and it generates a pay-off upon completion. I show that agents work harder the closer the project is to completion, and members of a larger team work harder than members of a smaller team-both individually and on aggregate-if and only if the project is sufficiently far from completion. I apply these results to determine the optimal size of a self-organized partnership, and to study the manager's problem who recruits agents to carry out a project, and must determine the team size and its members' incentive contracts. The main results are: (i) that the optimal symmetric contract compensates the agents only upon completing the project; and (ii) the optimal team size decreases in the expected length of the project.