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作者：Wiswall, Matthew; Zafar, Basit
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：This article studies the determinants of college major choice using an experimentally generated panel of beliefs, obtained by providing students with information on the true population distribution of various major-specific characteristics. Students logically revise their beliefs in response to the information, and their subjective beliefs about future major choice are associated with beliefs about their own earnings and ability. We estimate a rich model of college major choice using the panel...
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作者：Groes, Fane; Kircher, Philipp; Manovskii, Iourii
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; University of Edinburgh; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Using administrative panel data on the entire Danish population we document a new set of facts characterizing occupational mobility. For most occupations, mobility is U-shaped and directional: not only low but also high wage earners within an occupation have a particularly large probability of leaving their occupation, and the low (high) earners tend to switch to new occupations with lower (higher) average wages. Exceptions to this pattern of two-sided selection are occupations with steeply ri...
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作者：De La Croix, David; Mariani, Fabio
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Marriage institutions have changed over time, evolving from polygyny to monogamy, and then to serial monogamy (as defined by divorce and remarriage). We propose a unified theory of such institutional changes, where the dynamics of income distribution are the driving force. We characterize the marriage-market equilibrium in each of the three alternative regimes, and determine which one emerges as a political equilibrium, depending on the state of the economy. In a two-class society, a rise in t...
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作者：Gueell, Maia; Rodriguez Mora, Jose V.; Telmer, Christopher I.
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Edinburgh; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We propose a new methodology for measuring intergenerational mobility in economic well-being. Our method is based on the joint distribution of surnames and economic outcomes. It circumvents the need for intergenerational panel data, a long-standing stumbling block for understanding mobility. It does so by using cross-sectional data alongside a calibrated structural model to recover the traditional intergenerational elasticity measures. Our main idea is simple. If inheritance is important for e...
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作者：Board, Simon; Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We analyze a large, anonymous labour market in which firms motivate their workers via relational contracts. The market is frictionless and features on-the-job search, in that all acceptable vacancies are immediately filled and the employed compete with the unemployed for vacancies. While firms and workers are ex ante identical, the unique equilibrium exhibits a continuous distribution of contracts in which high wage firms have higher retention rates, more motivated workers and higher productiv...
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作者：Fuchs, William; Garicano, Luis; Rayo, Luis
作者单位：IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge-intensive economy in which agents endogenously specialize in either production or consulting. The resulting market for advice is plagued by informational problems, since both the difficulty of the questions posed to consultants and the knowledge of those consultants are hard to assess. We show that spot contracting is not efficient because lemons (in this case, self-employed producers with intermediate knowl...
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作者：Embrey, Matthew; Frechette, Guillaume R.; Lehrer, Steven F.
作者单位：Maastricht University; New York University; Queens University - Canada; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The experiments implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types, which are obstinate in their demands, creates incentives for all players to build reputations for being hard bargainers. The data are qualitatively consistent with the theory, as subjects mimic induced types. Furthermore, we find evidence for the presence of com...
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作者：Bruno, Valentina; Shin, Hyun Song
作者单位：American University; Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
摘要：We investigate global factors associated with bank capital flows. We formulate a model of the international banking system where global banks interact with local banks. The solution highlights the bank leverage cycle as the determinant of the transmission of financial conditions across borders through banking sector capital flows. A distinctive prediction of the model is that local currency appreciation is associated with higher leverage of the banking sector, thereby providing a conceptual br...
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作者：Bloom, Nicholas; Propper, Carol; Seiler, Stephan; Van Reenen, John
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Imperial College London; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyse the causal impact of competition on managerial quality and hospital performance. To address the endogeneity of market structure we analyse the English public hospital sector where entry and exit are controlled by the central government. Because closing hospitals in areas where the governing party is expecting a tight election race (marginals) is rare due to the fear of electoral defeat, we can use political marginality as an instrumental variable for the number of hospitals in a geo...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Jackson, Matthew O.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); Stanford University; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：We study the evolution of a social norm of cooperation in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behaviour that are stable in part due to agents' interpretations of private information about the past, influenced by occasional commonly observed past behaviours. For sufficiently backward-looking societies, history completely drives equilibrium play, leadin...
