From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: De La Croix, David; Mariani, Fabio
• 署名单位: Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdv001
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 565-607
• 关键词: child-mortality; parental divorce; risk-factor; GROWTH; sex; remarriage; disruption; INEQUALITY; Referendum; fertility

摘要

Marriage institutions have changed over time, evolving from polygyny to monogamy, and then to serial monogamy (as defined by divorce and remarriage). We propose a unified theory of such institutional changes, where the dynamics of income distribution are the driving force. We characterize the marriage-market equilibrium in each of the three alternative regimes, and determine which one emerges as a political equilibrium, depending on the state of the economy. In a two-class society, a rise in the share of rich males drives the change from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in the proportion of either rich females or rich males. Monogamy eases the transition to serial monogamy, since it promotes social mobility.