-
作者：Helpman, Elhanan; Itskhoki, Oleg; Muendler, Marc-Andreas; Redding, Stephen J.
作者单位：Harvard University; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); Princeton University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：While neoclassical theory emphasizes the impact of trade on wage inequality between occupations and sectors, more recent theories of firm heterogeneity point to the impact of trade on wage dispersion within occupations and sectors. Using linked employer-employee data for Brazil, we show that much of overall wage inequality arises within sector-occupations and for workers with similar observable characteristics; this within component is driven by wage dispersion between firms; and wage dispersi...
-
作者：Hirano, Tomohiro; Yanagawa, Noriyuki
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：This article analyses the existence and the effects of bubbles in an endogenous growth model with financial frictions and heterogeneous investments. Bubbles are likely to emerge when the degree of pledgeability is in the middle range, implying that improving the financial market might increase the potential for asset bubbles. Moreover, when the degree of pledgeability is relatively low, bubbles boost long-run growth; when it is relatively high, bubbles lower growth. Furthermore, we examine the...
-
作者：Di Tillio, Alfredo; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This article explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the profit maximizing mechanisms for the seller and characterize the conditions under which the seller can gain by employing an ambiguous mechanism. Finally, we propose a class of ambiguous mechanisms th...
-
作者：De La Roca, Jorge; Puga, Diego
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：Individual earnings are higher in bigger cities. We consider three reasons: spatial sorting of initially more productive workers, static advantages from workers' current location, and learning by working in bigger cities. Using rich administrative data for Spain, we find that workers in bigger cities do not have higher initial unobserved ability as reflected in fixed effects. Instead, they obtain an immediate static premium and accumulate more valuable experience. The additional value of exper...
-
作者：Heidhues, Paul; Koszegi, Botond; Murooka, Takeshi
作者单位：European School of Management & Technology; Central European University; University of Munich
摘要：We analyse conditions facilitating profitable deception in a simple model of a competitive retail market. Firms selling homogenous products set anticipated prices that consumers understand and additional prices that naive consumers ignore unless revealed to them by a firm, where we assume that there is a binding floor on the anticipated prices. Our main results establish that bad products (those with lower social surplus than an alternative) tend to be more reliably profitable than good produc...
-
作者：Demarzo, Peter M.; Sannikov, Yuliy
作者单位：Stanford University; Princeton University
摘要：We study a principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about future profitability from output, and the project can be abandoned/terminated if profitability is too low. With learning, shirking by the agent both reduces output and lowers the principal's estimate of future profitability. The agent can exploit this belief discrepancy and earn information rents, reducing his incentives to exert effort. The optimal contract controls information rents to improve incentives by distorting the ter...
-
作者：Condorelli, Daniele; Galeotti, Andrea; Renou, Ludovic
作者单位：University of Essex; European University Institute; University of Essex
摘要：In many markets, goods flow from initial producers to final customers travelling through many layers of intermediaries and information is asymmetric. We study a dynamic model of bargaining in networks that captures these features. We show that the equilibrium price demanded over time is non-monotonic, but the sequence of transaction prices declines over time, with the possible exception of the last period. The price dynamic is, therefore, reminiscent of fire-sales and hot-potato trading. Trade...
-
作者：Cloyne, James S.; Surico, Paolo
作者单位：Bank of England; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London Business School
摘要：Using a new narrative measure of fiscal policy shocks for the U.K., we show that households with mortgage debt exhibit large and significant consumption responses to tax changes. Homeowners without a mortgage, in contrast, do not adjust their expenditure, with responses not statistically different from zero at all horizons. We compare our findings to the predictions of traditional and newer theories of liquidity constraints, providing a novel interpretation for the aggregate effects of tax cha...
-
作者：Gentzkow, Matthew; Kamenica, Emir
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e. the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize...
-
作者：Dellavigna, Stefano; List, John A.; Malmendier, Ulrike; Rao, Gautam
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; Harvard University
摘要：Why do people vote? We design a field experiment to estimate a model of voting because others will ask. The expectation of being asked motivates turnout if individuals derive pride from telling others that they voted, or feel shame from admitting that they did not vote, provided that lying is costly. In a door-to-door survey about election turnout, we experimentally vary (1) the informational content and use of a flyer pre-announcing the survey, (2) the duration and payment for the survey, and...
