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作者：Stahl, Konrad; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：In markets with quality unobservable to buyers, third-party certification is often the only instrument to increase transparency. While both sellers and buyers have a demand for certification, its role differs fundamentally: sellers use it for signalling, buyers use it for inspection. Seller-induced certification leads to more transparency, because it is informative-even if unused. By contrast, buyer-induced certification incentivizes certifiers to limit transparency, as this raises demand for ...
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作者：Egorov, Georgy; Harstad, Bard
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Oslo
摘要：Public regulation is increasingly facing competition from private politics in the form of activism and corporate self-regulation. However, its effectiveness, welfare consequences, and interaction with public regulation are poorly understood. This article presents a unified dynamic framework for studying the interaction between public regulation, self-regulation, and boycotts. We show that the possibility of self-regulation saves on administrative costs, but also leads to delays. Without an act...
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作者：Harstad, Bard; Mideksa, Torben K.
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：This article provides a flexible model of resource extraction, such as deforestation, and derives the optimal conservation contract. When property rights are strong and districts are in charge of extracting their own resources to get revenues, conservation in one district benefits the others since the reduced supply raises the sales price. A central authority would internalize this positive externality and thus conserve more. When property rights are instead weak and extraction is illegal or c...
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作者：Davila, Eduardo; Korinek, Anton
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作者：Faria-e-Castro, Miguel; Martinez, Joseba; Philippon, Thomas
作者单位：New York University; New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In our model, governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the cost of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy. Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informa...
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作者：Chan, Marc K.
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：A hyperbolic discounting model of labour supply and welfare participation with heterogeneous time preference parameters is estimated. Exclusion restrictions are constructed from variations in behaviour induced by time limits in a welfare reform experiment. We find that most individuals are time-inconsistent, and they exhibit varying degrees of present bias and perception of the commitment problem. Introducing a welfare component to the tax system can make individuals worse off by aggravating t...
