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作者：Benyishay, Ariel; Mobarak, A. Mushfiq
作者单位：William & Mary; Yale University
摘要：Low adoption of agricultural technologies holds large productivity consequences for developing countries. Many countries hire agricultural extension agents to communicate with farmers about new technologies, even though a large academic literature has established that information from social networks is a key determinant of product adoption. We incorporate social learning in extension policy using a large-scale field experiment in which we communicate to farmers using different members of soci...
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作者：Cattaneo, Matias D.; Jansson, Michael; Ma, Xinwei
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; CREATES
摘要：We study the implications of including many covariates in a first-step estimate entering a two-step estimation procedure. We find that a first-order bias emerges when the number of included covariates is large relative to the square-root of sample size, rendering standard inference procedures invalid. We show that the jackknife is able to estimate this many covariates bias consistently, thereby delivering a new automatic bias-corrected two-step point estimator. The jackknife also consistently ...
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作者：D'acunto, Francesco; Prokopczuk, Marcel; Weber, Michael
作者单位：Boston College; Leibniz University Hannover; University of Reading; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Historically, European Jews have specialized in financial services while being the victims of antisemitism. We find that the present-day demand for finance is lower in German counties where historical antisemitism was higher, compared to otherwise similar counties. Households in counties with high historical antisemitism have similar saving rates but invest less in stocks, hold lower saving deposits, and are less likely to get a mortgage to finance homeownership after controlling for wealth an...
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作者：Bjorkegren, Daniel
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This article develops a method to estimate and simulate the adoption of a network good. I estimate demand for mobile phones as a function of individuals' social networks, coverage, and prices, using transaction data from nearly the entire network of Rwandan mobile phone subscribers at the time, over 4.5 years. I estimate the utility of adopting a phone based on its eventual usage: subscribers pay on the margin, so calls reveal the value of communicating with each contact. I use this structural...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Mueller-Frank, Manuel
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：This article provides a model of social learning where the order in which actions are taken is determined by an m-dimensional integer lattice rather than along a line as in the herding model. The observation structure is determined by a random network. Every agent links to each of his preceding lattice neighbours independently with probability p, and observes the actions of all agents that are reachable via a directed path in the realized social network. For m >= 2, we show that as p <1 goes t...
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作者：Draca, Mirk; Koutmeridis, Theodore; Machin, Stephen
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of Glasgow; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：To what extent does crime follow the pattern of potential gains to illegal activity? This article presents evidence on how criminals respond to this key incentive by reporting crime-price elasticities estimated from a comprehensive crime dataset containing detailed information on stolen items for London between 2002 and 2012. Evidence of significant positive crime-price elasticities are shown, for a panel of 44 consumer goods and for commodity related goods (jewellery, fuel, and metal crimes)....
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：Brown University; University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
摘要：Non-equilibrium models of choice (e.g. level-k reasoning) have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to the maximal set of functions that are implementable in mechanism design, however, they turn out to have similar implications. Focusing on single-valued rules, we discuss the role and implications of different behavioural anchors (arbitrary level-0 play), and prove a level-k revelation principle. If a function is level...
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作者：Augenblick, Ned; Rabin, Matthew
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Harvard University
摘要：We experimentally investigate the time-inconsistent taste for immediate gratification and future-preference misprediction. Across 7 weeks, 100 participants choose the number of unpleasant transcription tasks given various wages to complete immediately and at different future dates. Participants preferred 10-12% fewer tasks in the present compared to any future date, leading to an estimated beta of 0.83. Comparing predictions with actual immediate-work choices provides evidence against substant...
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作者：Caplin, Andrew; Dean, Mark; Leahy, John
作者单位：New York University; Columbia University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We unite two basic approaches to modelling limited attention in choice by showing that the rational inattention model implies the formation of consideration sets-only a subset of the available alternatives will be considered for choice. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for rationally inattentive behaviour which allow the identification of consideration sets. In simple settings, chosen options are those that are best on a stand-alone basis. In richer settings, the consideration se...
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作者：Bhaskar, V; Thomas, Caroline
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching, when records of past transgressions are retained for a finite length of time. To incentivize trustworthiness, defaulters should be punished by temporary exclusion. However, it is profitable to trust defaulters who are on the verge of rehabilitation. With perfect bounded information, defaulter exclusion unravels and trust cannot be sustained, in any purifiable equilibrium. A coarse information structure, that pools recen...
