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作者：Ispano, Alessandro; Vida, Peter
作者单位：Universite Bourgogne Europe; CY Cergy Paris Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Corvinus University Budapest; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：We provide a model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of the law enforcer's evidence, which is informative about the suspect's status and may also disprove lies. We compare prosecution errors in the equilibrium of the one-shot interrogation and in the optimal mechanism under full commitment. We describe a back-and-forth interrogation with disclosure of the evidence that implements the optimum in eq...
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作者：Liu, Ernest; Tsyvinski, Aleh
作者单位：Princeton University; Yale University
摘要：We develop a dynamic model of input-output networks that incorporates adjustment costs of changing inputs. Our closed-form solution for the dynamics of the economy shows that temporary shocks to upstream sectors, whose output travels through long supply chains, have disproportionately significant welfare impact compared to affected sectors' Domar weights. We conduct a spectral analysis of the U.S. production network and reveal that the welfare impact of temporary sectoral shocks can be represe...
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作者：Sadka, Joyce; Seira, Enrique; Woodruff, Christopher
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Michigan State University; University of Oxford
摘要：Well-functioning courts are essential for the health of both financial and real economies. Courts function poorly in most lower-income countries, but the root causes of poor performance are not well understood. We use field experiments with ongoing cases to analyse sources of dysfunction in Mexico's largest labour court. We provide parties with personalized predictions for case outcomes and show that this information nearly doubles settlement rates and reduces average case duration. The experi...
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作者：Jarosch, Gregor; Nimczik, Jan Sebastian; Sorkin, Isaac
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; European School of Management & Technology; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Stanford University
摘要：We develop a model of size-based market power in a frictional labour market. In the canonical search environment, competition for workers is encoded in outside options. In our granular setting, large employers remove their own job postings from their workers' outside option. Thus, size gives market power and a more concentrated market structure depresses wages because it reduces competition for workers. We calibrate the model to Austrian data and find that such size-based market power depresse...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Ozdaglar, Asuman; Siderius, James
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Dartmouth College
摘要：We present a model of online content sharing where agents sequentially observe an article and decide whether to share it with others. This content may or may not contain misinformation. Each agent starts with an ideological bias and gains utility from positive social media interactions but does not want to be called out for propagating misinformation. We characterize the (Bayesian-Nash) equilibria of this social media game and establish that it exhibits strategic complementarities. Under this ...
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作者：Jagadeesan, Ravi; Vocke, Karolina
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Innsbruck
摘要：In matching models, pairwise-stable outcomes do not generally exist without substantial restrictions on both preferences and the topology of the network of contracts. We address the foundations of matching markets by developing a matching model with a continuum of agents that allows for arbitrary preferences and network structures. We show that pairwise-stable outcomes are guaranteed to exist. When agents can interact with multiple other counterparties, pairwise stability is too weak of a solu...
