Granular Search, Market Structure, and Wages

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jarosch, Gregor; Nimczik, Jan Sebastian; Sorkin, Isaac
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; European School of Management & Technology; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae004
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3569-3607
• 关键词: labor-market; recall expectations; PRODUCTIVITY; dispersion; duration; workers; COSTS; price; jobs

摘要

We develop a model of size-based market power in a frictional labour market. In the canonical search environment, competition for workers is encoded in outside options. In our granular setting, large employers remove their own job postings from their workers' outside option. Thus, size gives market power and a more concentrated market structure depresses wages because it reduces competition for workers. We calibrate the model to Austrian data and find that such size-based market power depresses wages by about 2.6% or 1,500 euros annually per worker.