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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Khanna, Manshu; Siegenthaler, Simon
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Peking University; Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We design a laboratory experiment to study bargaining behaviour when negotiations involve multiple issues. Parties must discover both trading prices and agreement scopes, giving rise to unexplored information structures and bargaining strategies. We find that bargainers often trade the efficient set of issues despite lacking information about individual aspects. However, beneficial agreements critically hinge on integrated negotiations that allow deals on bundles of issues. Moreover, access to...
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作者：D'Haultfoeuille, X.; Gaillac, C.; Maurel, A.
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study partially linear models when the outcome of interest and some of the covariates are observed in two different datasets that cannot be linked. This type of data combination problem arises very frequently in empirical microeconomics. Using recent tools from optimal transport theory, we derive a constructive characterization of the sharp identified set. We then build on this result and develop a novel inference method that exploits the specific geometric properties of the identified set....
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作者：McGuirk, Eoin F.; Nunn, Nathan
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University of British Columbia; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
摘要：We consider the effects of climate change on seasonally migrant populations that herd livestock-i.e. transhumant pastoralists-in Africa. Traditionally, transhumant pastoralists benefit from a cooperative relationship with sedentary agriculturalists whereby arable land is used for crop farming in the wet season and animal grazing in the dry season. Rainfall scarcity can disrupt this arrangement by inducing pastoral groups to migrate to agricultural lands before the harvest, causing conflict to ...
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作者：Beraja, Martin; Zorzi, Nathan
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Dartmouth College
摘要：How should the government respond to automation? We study this question in a heterogeneous agent model that takes worker displacement seriously. We recognize that displaced workers face two frictions in practice: reallocation is slow and borrowing is limited. We analyze a second best problem where the government can tax automation but lacks redistributive tools to fully alleviate borrowing frictions. The equilibrium is (constrained) inefficient and automation is excessive. Firms do not interna...
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作者：Pei, Harry; Strulovici, Bruno
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We construct mechanisms that can robustly implement any desired social choice function when (1) agents may incur a cost to learn the state of the world, (2) with small probability, agents' preferences can be arbitrarily different from some baseline known to the mechanism designer, and (3) the mechanism designer does not know agents' beliefs and higher-order beliefs about one another's preferences. The mechanisms we propose have a natural interpretation and do not require the mechanism designer...
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作者：Bronsoler, Ari; Gruber, Jonathan; Seira, Enrique
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：Public health systems are dominant in much of the world but often face fiscal constraints that lead to rationing of care. As a result, private sector healthcare providers could in theory beneficially supplement public systems, but evaluating the benefits of private alternatives has been challenging. We evaluate a private supplement to the free public health system for one of the world's deadliest health problems, diabetes. We estimate enormous impacts of the private supplement, increasing the ...
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作者：Aizawa, Naoki; Kim, Soojin; Rhee, Serena
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Chung Ang University
摘要：This article studies how firms' screening incentives in the labour market affect the optimal design of social insurance programs and quantitatively assesses the U.S. disability policies accounting for firms' screening of the disabled. We develop an equilibrium search model where workers with different productivities have heterogeneous preferences over non-wage benefits and firms cannot offer an employment contract that explicitly depends on worker types. In this environment, firms may use cont...
