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作者：Blanchard, Emily J.; Bown, Chad P.; Johnson, Robert C.
作者单位：Dartmouth College; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Peterson Institute for International Economics; University of Notre Dame; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：How do global value chain (GVC) linkages modify countries' incentives to impose import protection? Are these linkages important determinants of trade policy in practice? We develop a new approach to modelling tariff setting with GVCs, in which optimal policy depends on the nationality of value-added content embedded in home and foreign final goods. Theory predicts that discretionary tariffs will be decreasing in the domestic content of foreign-produced final goods and the foreign content of do...
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作者：Grennan, Matthew; Myers, Kyle R.; Swanson, Ashley; Chatterji, Aaron
作者单位：Emory University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Duke University
摘要：We study how firms target and influence expert intermediaries. In our context, pharmaceutical manufacturers provide payments to physicians during promotional interactions. We develop an identification strategy based on plausibly exogenous variation in payments driven by differential exposure to spillovers from AMC CoI policies. Using a case study of an important class of cardiovascular drugs, we estimate heterogeneous effects of payments on prescribing, with firms targeting highly responsive p...
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作者：Murto, Pauli; Valimaki, Juuso
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：Many auctions and procurement contests entail non-trivial bidding costs, which makes the bidders' participation decisions endogenous to the auction design. We analyse the effect of different auction rules on potential bidders' incentives to participate. We focus on first-price auctions with affiliated common values and a large pool of potential bidders. Our main interest is on auctions where the realized number of bidders is unknown at the bidding stage. In contrast to the standard case, both ...
