作者：Chin, Moya
作者单位：International Monetary Fund
摘要：Electoral rules determine how voters' preferences are aggregated and translated into political representation. Using a regression discontinuity design, I contrast single- and two- round elections in Brazil. In two- round elections, the eventual winner must obtain at least 50 percent of the vote. I show that two- round elections provide incentives for candidates to secure a broader base of support and provide public goods more broadly. Candidates represent a more geographically diverse group of...
作者：Fischer, Torben; Froelich, Markus; Landmann, Andreas
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Erlangen Nuremberg
摘要：We present robust evidence on adverse selection in hospitalization insurance for low-income individuals that received first-time access to insurance. A large randomized control trial from Pakistan allows us to separate adverse selection from moral hazard, estimate how selection changes at different points of the demand curve, and test simple measures to limit adverse selection. The results reveal sub-stantial selection in individual policies, leading to welfare losses and the threat of a marke...
