-
作者：Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Rochester
摘要：We develop a theory of firm scope and structure in which merging two firms allows the integrated firm's top management to allocate resources that are costly to trade. However, information about their use resides with division managers. We show that establishing truthful upward communication raises the cost of inducing managerial effort compared with stand-alone firms. This effect dominates a positive effect on effort driven by competition for the firm's resources. We derive predictions about o...
-
作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We model privacy as an agent's choice of action being unobservable to others. An agent derives utility from his action, the aggregate of agents' actions, and other agents' perceptions of his type. If his action is unobservable, he takes his full-information optimal action and is pooled with other types, while if observable, then he distorts it to enhance others' perceptions of him. This increases the public good, hut the disutility from distortion is a social cost. When the disutility of disto...
-
作者：Jeon, Doh-Shin; Rochet, Jean-Charles
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：More and more academic journals are adopting an open access policy by which articles are accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through author fees. We study the consequences of this open access policy on the quality standard of an electronic academic journal. If the journal's objective were to maximize social welfare, open access would be optimal. However, we show that if the journal has a different objective (such as maximizing readers' utility, the impact of the jo...
