Resource Allocation and Organizational Form

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.2.1
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1-33
• 关键词: internal capital-markets; corporate resources; moral hazard; information-transmission; managerial incentives; firm; DESIGN; COMPETITION; teams; COORDINATION

摘要

We develop a theory of firm scope and structure in which merging two firms allows the integrated firm's top management to allocate resources that are costly to trade. However, information about their use resides with division managers. We show that establishing truthful upward communication raises the cost of inducing managerial effort compared with stand-alone firms. This effect dominates a positive effect on effort driven by competition for the firm's resources. We derive predictions about optimal firm scope and structure. In particular, we show why it is optimal to separate the tasks of allocating resources and running a division. (JEL D21, D23, D82, G34)