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作者：Duffie, Darrell; Giroux, Gaston; Manso, Gustavo
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the percolation of information of common interest through a large market as agents encounter and reveal information to each other over time. We provide an explicit solution for the dynamics of the cross-sectional distribution of posterior beliefs. We also show that convergence of the cross-sectional distribution of beliefs to a common posterior is exponential and that the rate of convergence does not depend on the size of the groups of agents that meet. The rate of convergence is mere...
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作者：Ottaviani, Marco; Sorensen, Peter Norman
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University; University of Copenhagen
摘要：According to the favorite-longshot bias, the expected return on an outcome tends to increase in the fraction of bets laid on that outcome. We derive testable implications for the direction and extent of the bias depending on the ratio of private information to noise present in the market. We link this ratio to observables such as the number of bettors, the number of outcomes, the amount of private information, the level of participation generated by recreational interest in the event, the divi...
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作者：Brunner, Christoph; Goeree, Jacob K.; Holt, Charles A.; Ledyard, John O.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Virginia
摘要：This paper reports laboratory experiments that evaluate the performance of a flexible package bidding format developed by the FCC, in comparison with other combinatorial formats. In general, the interest of policy makers in combinatorial auctions is justified by the laboratory data. When value complementarities are present, package bidding yields improved performance. We find clear differences among the combinatorial auction formats both in terms of efficiency and seller revenue, however. Nota...
