An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Brunner, Christoph; Goeree, Jacob K.; Holt, Charles A.; Ledyard, John O.
署名单位：
California Institute of Technology; University of Virginia
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.2.1.39
发表日期：
2010
页码：
39-57
关键词：
摘要：
This paper reports laboratory experiments that evaluate the performance of a flexible package bidding format developed by the FCC, in comparison with other combinatorial formats. In general, the interest of policy makers in combinatorial auctions is justified by the laboratory data. When value complementarities are present, package bidding yields improved performance. We find clear differences among the combinatorial auction formats both in terms of efficiency and seller revenue, however. Notably, the combinatorial clock provides the highest revenue. The FCC's flexible package bidding format performed worse than the alternatives, which is one of the main reasons why it was not implemented. (JEL D44, H82)
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