作者：von Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf; Mookherjee, Dilip
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Boston University
摘要：What are the effects of restricting bonded labor clauses in tenancy or debt contracts? While such restrictions reduce agents' ability to credibly commit ex ante to repay principals in states where they default on their financial obligations, they also generate a pecuniary externality on other principal-agent pairs by reducing the equilibrium profit earned by principals. This turns out to imply that on both political and normative grounds, restrictions on bonded labor become more attractive whe...
作者：Brunner, Christoph; Goeree, Jacob K.; Holt, Charles A.; Ledyard, John O.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Virginia
摘要：This paper reports laboratory experiments that evaluate the performance of a flexible package bidding format developed by the FCC, in comparison with other combinatorial formats. In general, the interest of policy makers in combinatorial auctions is justified by the laboratory data. When value complementarities are present, package bidding yields improved performance. We find clear differences among the combinatorial auction formats both in terms of efficiency and seller revenue, however. Nota...
