The Political Economy of Debt Bondage

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: von Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf; Mookherjee, Dilip
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics; Boston University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.3.44
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 44-84
• 关键词: bankruptcy; LAW

摘要

What are the effects of restricting bonded labor clauses in tenancy or debt contracts? While such restrictions reduce agents' ability to credibly commit ex ante to repay principals in states where they default on their financial obligations, they also generate a pecuniary externality on other principal-agent pairs by reducing the equilibrium profit earned by principals. This turns out to imply that on both political and normative grounds, restrictions on bonded labor become more attractive when borrowers become wealthier or the range of collateral instruments widens.