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作者：Demuynck, Thomas; Seel, Christian; Tran, Giang
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Maastricht University
摘要：We develop an index of competitiveness and cooperativeness that is based on the primitives of a normal-form game, i.e., players, strate-gies and payoffs. The index relies on the unique decomposition of a given game into a zero-sum game and a common interest game. The index decreases in the distance to its zero-sum part and increases in the distance to its common interest part. The comparative statics of our index coincide with economic intuition. The index also supports experimental findings i...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Olckers, Matthew
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Monash University
摘要：We analyze the design of a mechanism to extract a ranking of individuals according to a unidimensional characteristic, such as ability or need. Individuals, connected on a social network, only have local information about the ranking. We show that a planner can construct an ex post incentive compatible and efficient mechanism if and only if every pair of friends has a friend in common. We characterize the windmill network as the sparsest social network for which the planner can always construc...
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作者：Board, Simon; Meyer-ter-vehn, Moritz
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study the life cycle of a firm that produces a good of unknown quality. The firm manages its quality by investing while consumers learn via public breakthroughs; if the firm fails to generate such breakthroughs, its revenue falls and it eventually exits. Optimal investment depends on the firm???s reputation (the market???s belief about its quality) and self-esteem (the firm???s own belief about its quality), and is single-peaked in the time since a breakthrough. We derive predictions about ...
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作者：Teh, Tat-How; Wright, Julian
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：We explore the implications of steering by an informed profit-maximizing intermediary. The intermediary steers consumers by recommending firms, taking into account both the commissions firms offer and the prices they set. Such steering results in higher commissions and consumer prices, so that consumers only benefit from intermediation when their search cost is sufficiently high. Steering reverses the normal relationship between competition and price, with prices increasing in the number of co...
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作者：Chao, Yong; Tan, Guofu; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
作者单位：University of Louisville; University of Southern California; Lingnan University
摘要：We consider a nonlinear pricing problem faced by a dominant firm competing with a minor firm. The dominant firm offers a general tariff first, and then the minor firm responds with a per-unit price, followed by a buyer choosing her purchases. By developing a mechanism-design approach to solve the subgame perfect equilibrium, we characterize the dominant firm's optimal nonlinear tariff, which exhibits convexity and yet can display quantity discounts. In equilibrium the dominant firm uses a cont...
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作者：Markovich, Sarit; Yehezkel, Yaron
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider platform competition for small users and a user group. One platform enjoys a quality advantage and the other benefits from favorable beliefs. We study whether the group mitigates the users' coordination problem-i.e., joining a low-quality platform because they believe that other users would do the same. We find that a group that can facilitate coordination on the high-quality platform may choose to maintain the dominance of the low-quality one. Users' utility is non-monotonic in th...
