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作者：Gentzkow, Matthew; Wong, Michael B.; Zhang, Allen T.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We study the role of endogenous trust in amplifying ideological bias. Agents in our model learn a sequence of states from sources whose accuracy is ex ante uncertain. Agents learn these accuracies by comparing their own reasoning about the states based on introspection or direct experience to the sources' reports. Small biases in this reasoning can cause large ideological differences in the agents' trust in information sources and their beliefs about the states, and may lead agents to become o...
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作者：Correa, Sofia
作者单位：Universidad de Chile
摘要：A continuum of citizens with heterogeneous opportunity costs participates in a protest with well-defined demands. As long as the government doesn't concede, it pays a cost increasing in time and participation. Citizens who are part of the victory team enjoy a veteran reward. Every equilibrium with protest displays a buildup stage during which citizens join the protest but the government ignores them, a peak at which the government concedes with positive probability, and a decay stage in which ...
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作者：Choi, Syngjoo; Kim, Seonghoon; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); Singapore Management University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We conduct a large-scale experiment to measure elementary aspects of strategic thinking skills and their linkage to labor market outcomes. Two incentivized measures of higher-order rationality and backward induction are developed. Males' (females') strategic thinking skills are positively (negatively) associated with individual labor income. However, among married individuals, strategic thinking skills are significantly and positively associated with their household labor income regardless of ...
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作者：Vives, Xavier; Vravosinos, Orestis
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; New York University
摘要：We examine the effects of overlapping ownership among existing firms deciding whether to enter a product market. We show that in most cases-and especially when overlapping ownership is already widespread-an increase in the extent of overlapping ownership will harm welfare by softening product market competition, reducing entry, and thereby (in contrast to standard results) inducing insufficient entry and magnifying the negative impact of an increase of entry costs on entry. Overlapping ownersh...
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作者：Karle, Heiko; Kerzenmacher, Florian; Schumacher, Heiner; Verboven, Frank
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Innsbruck; KU Leuven
摘要：Empirical search cost estimates are often large and increasing in the size of the transaction. We conduct an online search experiment in which we manipulate the price scale while keeping the physical search effort per price quote constant. Additionally, we obtain a direct measure of subjects' opportunity costs of time. Using a standard search model, we confirm that search cost estimates are large and increasing in the price scale. We then modify the model to incorporate context effects with re...
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作者：Clark, Robert; Coviello, Decio; De Leverano, Adriano
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要：Clustered bids and a missing mass of nearly tied bids have both been proposed as markers of collusion. We present causal empirical evidence from an actual procurement cartel that bidding involves both clustering and a gap around the winning bid. We support these results with information from the testimony of cartel participants that explains how both patterns arise naturally as part of an arrangement featuring complementary bidding. Based on these findings, we develop an easy-to-implement scre...
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作者：Levy, Yehuda John; Veiga, Andre
作者单位：University of Glasgow; Imperial College London
摘要：We model competitive insurance markets with continuous cost-types. A regulator sets minimum and maximum coverage levels and a fee for nonbuyers. Equilibrium is unique if the type distribution is log-concave. Increasing the nonpurchase fee increases welfare if the density of types is decreasing. The optimal level of the minimum coverage is positive, is below full insurance, and induces some pooling at the minimum coverage contract. The optimal level of the maximum coverage is full insurance, ev...
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作者：Grochulski, Borys; Wong, Russell; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study the incentive role of severance compensation. In a canonical principal-agent model, we introduce exogenous job destruction risk and show that compensation following job destruction can reduce overall incentive costs. To mitigate the risk of inefficient endogenous termination, agents with low continuation value receive no severance and lose value at job destruction, while agents with high continuation value receive high severance and gain value at job destruction. Comparative statics o...
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作者：Li, Xuelin; Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：Columbia University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We study pivots as signaling devices in a dynamic experimentation model. An entrepreneur receives funding from an investor and has private information about a project, which requires costly experimentation to succeed. The entrepreneur has a real option to pivot, i.e., to abandon the project and to start a new one. Investors learn about the project from the arrival of exogenous information and from the entrepreneur's pivoting decisions. We characterize signaling equilibria in which high-skill e...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Nunez, Matias
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：We describe a sequential mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks agents to take turns in defining prices for each outcome, with a final player choosing an outcome for all: Price and Choose. The choice triggers a sequence of payments from each agent to the preceding agent. We present several extensions. First, payoff inequalities may be reduced by endogenizing the order of play. Second, our results extend to a...
