作者：ROTH, AE; EREV, I
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We use simple learning models to track the behavior observed in experiments concerning three extensive form games with similar perfect equilibria. In only two of the games does observed behavior approach the perfect equilibrium as players gain experience. We examine a family of learning models which possess some of the robust properties of learning noted in the psychology literature. The intermediate term predictions of these models track well the observed behavior in all three games, even tho...
作者：BINMORE, KG; SAMUELSON, L; VAUGHAN, R
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We examine an evolutionary process based on an explicit model of choice in which agents occasionally make mistakes in choosing their strategies. If the population size is sufficiently large, then the deterministic replicator dynamics provides a good approximation of the behavior of the system over finite time periods. The limiting behavior of the process is captured by combinatorial techniques introduced by Freidlin and Wentzell and popularized by Young and Kandori, Mailath, and Rob. We find c...
