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作者：Aizenman, J; Turnovsky, SJ
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：This paper characterises the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side and sovereign risk on the burrower side. The impacts of such reserve requirements on the equilibrium default risk and borrowing are analysed and their welfare implications discussed. More generous bailouts, financed by the high-income block, encourage borrowing and increase the probability of default. The optimal reserve requirements for both lender and borrower ar...
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作者：Bosman, R; van Winden, F
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：In this experimental study of a two player power-to-take game, players earn an income in an individual effort task preceding the game, The game has two stages, First, one player can claim any part of the other's income (take rate). Then, the latter player can respond by destroying own income. We focus on how emotions influence responses and show: (1) a higher take rate increases (decreases) intensity of negative (positive) emotions; (2) negative emotions drive destruction; (3) at high emotiona...
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作者：Finkelstein, A; Poterba, J
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper explores adverse selection in the voluntary and compulsory individual annuity markets in the United Kingdom. Two empirical regularities support standard models of adverse selection. First, annuitants are longer-lived than non-annuitants. These mortality differences are more pronounced in the voluntary than in the compulsory annuity market. We estimate that the amount of adverse selection in the compulsory market is about one half of that in the voluntary market. Second the pricing o...
