Reserve requirements on sovereign debt in the presence of moral hazard - On debtors or creditors?

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Aizenman, J; Turnovsky, SJ
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.0j675
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 107-132
• 关键词: information; CONTRACTS; RISK

摘要

This paper characterises the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side and sovereign risk on the burrower side. The impacts of such reserve requirements on the equilibrium default risk and borrowing are analysed and their welfare implications discussed. More generous bailouts, financed by the high-income block, encourage borrowing and increase the probability of default. The optimal reserve requirements for both lender and borrower are characterised. The introduction of a reserve requirement in either country reduces the default risk and raises the welfare of both the high-income and the emerging-market economies.