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作者：Kühn, KU; Padilla, AJ
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：In this paper, we construct a new basis for insider-outsider theory that acknowledges that insiders are typically easier to organise, so that they can delegate their bargaining decisions to a representative if they want to. We show that harassment or discrimination of new workers by the insider work force is neither individually rational nor needed to explain union formation or inefficient hiring decisions. However, we show that there is a strong tendency for overemployment. Unions tend to inc...
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作者：Johansson-Stenman, O; Carlsson, F; Daruvala, D
作者单位：University of Gothenburg
摘要：Individuals' aversion to risk and inequality, and their concern For relative standing, are measured through experimental choices between hypothetical societies. It is found that, oil average, individuals are both fairly inequality-averse and have a strong Concern lot. relative income. The results are used to illustrate welfare consequences based on a utilitarian SWF and a modified CRRA utility function. It is shown that the social marginal utility of income may then become negative, even at in...
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作者：Rudebusch, GD
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco
摘要：Nominal income rules for monetary policy have long been debated, but two issues are of particular recent interest. First, there are questions about the performance of such rules over a range of plausible empirical models - especially models with and without explicit rational inflation expeciations. Second, performance of these rules ill re ll time using the type of data that is actually available contemporaneously to policy makers rather than final revised data. This paper determines optimal m...
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作者：Marin, D; Schnitzer, M
作者单位：University of Munich
摘要：Starting with the international debt crisis in the 1980s, international barter increased substantially. More recently, barter has emerged in Russia and South East Asia. This paper examines how barter can help highly indebted countries to finance imports if they cannot use standard credit arrangements. We argue that payment in goods is easier to enforce than payment in money. However, debtors may pay with inferior quality products. We rank goods with respect to these incentive properties and de...
