Union power, replacement and labour market dynamics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kühn, KU; Padilla, AJ
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00037
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 317-343
• 关键词: involuntary unemployment; COOPERATION; Harassment; COSTS

摘要

In this paper, we construct a new basis for insider-outsider theory that acknowledges that insiders are typically easier to organise, so that they can delegate their bargaining decisions to a representative if they want to. We show that harassment or discrimination of new workers by the insider work force is neither individually rational nor needed to explain union formation or inefficient hiring decisions. However, we show that there is a strong tendency for overemployment. Unions tend to increase the efficiency of hiring decisions although union contracts will look like inducing underemployment.