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作者：Guttman, JM
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：This paper models self-enforcing agreements and the evolution of preferences for reciprocity when all agents are rational, Bayesian optimisers. In this 'indirect' evolutionary model, player types are defined not by their strategies, but by their preferences. The paper studies the evolution of a community consisting of 'opportunists', who maximise material payoffs, and 'reciprocators', who prefer joint co-operation to exploiting their opponents. Players are randomly matched to play a finitely r...
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作者：Disney, R; Haskel, J; Heden, Y
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of London; Queen Mary University London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We analyse productivity growth in UK manufacturing 1980-92 using the newly available ARD panel of establishments drawn from the Census of Production. We examine the contribution to productivity growth of 'internal' restructuring (such as new technology and organisational change among survivors) and 'external' restructuring (exit, entry and market share change). We find that (a) 'external restructuring' accounts for 50% of establishment labour productivity growth and 80-90% of establishment TFP...
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作者：Barr, A
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：An economic experiment involving 24 small, tightly knit communities allows us to distinguish between trusting or trust-like behaviour based on expectational and non-expectational motivations. A model linking trusting behaviour to expectations of trustworthiness explains over half of the variation across communities. However, the estimated parameters are different (while being similarly well defined) for traditional and resettled communities. This is taken as evidence that non-expectational mot...
