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作者：Arrow, KJ
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：I give some personal reactions to the development of game theory as it found application in economic analysis during the last half-century. I discuss which contributions have in fact found use and, in particular, what was the role of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in light of previous and subsequent developments. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Halpern, JY
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I consider issues in distributed computation that should be of relevance to game theory. In particular, 1 focus on (a) representing knowledge and uncertainty, (b) dealing with failures, and (c) specification of mechanisms. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Foster, DP; Young, HP
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Pennsylvania; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hypotheses about their opponents' repeated game strategies. They frequently test their hypotheses against the opponents' recent actions. When a hypothesis fails a test, a new one is adopted. Play is almost rational in the sense that, at each point in time, the players' strategies are epsilon-best replies to their beliefs. We show that, at least 1-epsilon of the time t these hypothesis testing strat...
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作者：Koller, D; Milch, B
作者单位：Stanford University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The traditional representations of games using the extensive form or the strategic form obscure much of the structure of real-world games. In this paper, we propose a graphical representation for noncooperative games-multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs). The basic elements in the MAID representation are variables, allowing an explicit representation of dependence, or relevance, relationships among variables. We define a decision variable D' as strategically relevant to D if, to optimize the ...
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作者：Espinosa, MP; Macho-Stadler, I
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Basque Country
摘要：We analyze the formation of competing partnerships as a sequential game with moral hazard within coalitions. In a linear Cournot model, we show that when moral hazard is very severe, no partnerships will form. However, when moral hazard is not too severe, the coalition structure may be more concentrated than it is in the absence of moral hazard. Concerning industry profits, in the absence of moral hazard too many coalitions are formed in equilibrium as compared to the efficient outcome, but mo...
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作者：Kittsteiner, T
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of London; University College London
摘要：In a symmetric independent private values setting a double auction dissolves a partnership efficiently. This well-known result remains valid in a model with interdependent valuations and forced participation. However, if participation is voluntary agents might prefer to prevent the dissolution by nonparticipation. This is due to the fact that bidders simultaneously suffer from a winners' and a losers' curse which they are unable to correct for by decreasing or increasing their bids. Even thoug...
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作者：Napel, S
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：Two agents recurrently play a 2 x 2 version of the ultimatum game. Each player sticks to his past action if it was satisfactory relative to an endogenous aspiration level and otherwise abandons it with positive probability. This type of satisficing behavior is shown to yield efficiency in the limit. It does not favor a specific distribution of surplus and can give an explanation for the incidence of equitable offers in practice. Numerical investigations link a player's character as captured by...
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作者：Aumann, RJ
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The Presidential Address at the First International Congress of the Game Theory Society, held in Bilbao, Spain, in July of 2000. The address contains a discussion of the Congress, of the functions and activities of the Society, of the Logo of the Society, of past accomplishments of the discipline, and of some future directions for research. The address is preceded by an introduction by David Kreps. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
