Competition, Cooperation and Collective Choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen; Columbia University; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12096
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: F163-F195
• 关键词: intergroup competition; public-goods; voter participation; affirmative-action; incentives; provision; tournaments; performance; GENDER; overconfidence

摘要

The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This study explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decide, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.