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作者：Sattinger, M
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：This paper develops the theory of statistical discrimination in the form of unequal employment criteria and interviews. Workers differ by imperfectly observed 'quit rate.' Profit maximization leads firms to set stricter employment criteria or interview fewer workers from the group with a greater proportion of high-quit-rate workers. The theory can explain unemployment differences between groups and the total exclusion of a group from a labor market. Although statistical discrimination constitu...
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作者：Coles, MG; Smith, E
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This paper models trading patterns when marketplaces exist and goods are differentiated. When first visiting the market, a buyer samples a stock of goods. If fortunate, the buyer finds a match, purchases one of these goods and then exits. If not, the buyer can now only match with the now of new goods. In a steady state, the stock of unmatched traders on one side of the market is trying to match with the now of new traders on the other side. This behaviour is shown to describe matching patterns...
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作者：Khalil, F; Parigi, BM
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：We model risky lending with costly state verification, but without commitment to an audit strategy. The borrower under-reports with a positive probability in the successful state, and the lender audits with a positive probability after a report of failure. Under lack of commitment to audit probabilities, an increase in loan size convinces the borrower that the lender has a high stake in an audit. This reduces the probability of under-reporting and leads to overinvestment relative to the commit...
