Marketplaces and matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coles, MG; Smith, E
• 署名单位: University of Essex
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.2307/2527239
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 239-255
• 关键词: search equilibrium

摘要

This paper models trading patterns when marketplaces exist and goods are differentiated. When first visiting the market, a buyer samples a stock of goods. If fortunate, the buyer finds a match, purchases one of these goods and then exits. If not, the buyer can now only match with the now of new goods. In a steady state, the stock of unmatched traders on one side of the market is trying to match with the now of new traders on the other side. This behaviour is shown to describe matching patterns between unemployed job seekers and vacancies in U.K. Job Centres.