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作者：Fuster, L; Imrohoroglu, A; Imrohoroglu, S
作者单位：University of Southern California; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：In this article, we study the welfare effects of unfunded social security in a general equilibrium model populated with overlapping generations of altruistic individuals that differ in lifetime expectancy and earnings ability. Contrary to previous research, our results indicate that steady-state welfare increases with social security for most households, although by very different amounts. This result is mainly due to two factors. First, the presence of two-sided altruism significantly mitigat...
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作者：Sigouin, C
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada
摘要：This article studies the role of risk sharing in dynamic credit relationships that are secured by physical collateral. It is shown that, when borrowers and lenders cannot commit not to terminate relationships (through default in the first case and liquidation in the second), overinvestment is optimal. Overinvestment facilitates risk sharing in this context: It occurs in expectation of periods in which lenders are unwilling to supply all the funds necessary to achieve complete risk sharing. Typ...
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作者：Schluter, C; Trede, M
作者单位：University of Southampton; University of Munster
摘要：Mobility indices are popular tools designed to quantify the extent of income changes by aggregating local distributional change into a global scalar according to some rule. For some mobility measures, this aggregation rule is only implicit in their standard definition. We derive an insightful approximation to the (statistical) aggregation rule for the important class of mobility indices introduced by Shorrocks (Journal of Economic Theory 19 (1978), 376-93) and further generalized by Maasoumi a...
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作者：Klein, P; Ríos-Rull, J
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Pennsylvania; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article studies the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot commit itself beyond the next period's capital income tax rate. We find that the results contrast markedly with those under full commitment. First, capital income tax rates are very high (65% on average versus close to zero on average under full commitment). Second, labor income taxes are rather low on average (about 12% versus a value of around 31 % under full commitment). Fina...
