A welfare analysis of social security in a dynastic framework

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fuster, L; Imrohoroglu, A; Imrohoroglu, S
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00108
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1247-1274
• 关键词: intergenerational transfers; accumulation; WEALTH

摘要

In this article, we study the welfare effects of unfunded social security in a general equilibrium model populated with overlapping generations of altruistic individuals that differ in lifetime expectancy and earnings ability. Contrary to previous research, our results indicate that steady-state welfare increases with social security for most households, although by very different amounts. This result is mainly due to two factors. First, the presence of two-sided altruism significantly mitigates the crowding out effect of unfunded social security. Second, ability shocks and uncertain lifetimes generate significant heterogeneity among households to yield different induced preferences for social security.