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作者：Levine, David K.; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Zurita, Felipe
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：When a firm is forced to pay abnormally high wages, hiring transfers rents. This effectively endows the employer with the ability to grant favors, and he may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production. We refer to this as the brother-in-law effect. This article analyzes its consequences. When the brother-in-law effect is due to unionization, decisions regarding both the number and type of workers employed could be inefficient; overemployment could obtain even relative to the workf...
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作者：Santos-Pinto, Luis
作者单位：University of Lausanne
摘要：This article analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent's self-assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, correctly assesses workers' productivities and self-beliefs when setting tournament prizes. The article shows that, under a variety of circumstances, firms can benefit from worker positive self-image. The articl...
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作者：Amaral, Pedro S.; Quintin, Erwan
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Dallas
摘要：We present a model of economic development where the importance of financial differences caused by limited enforcement can be measured. Economies where enforcement is poor direct less capital to the production sector and employ less efficient technologies. Calibrated simulations reveal that the resulting effect on output is large. Furthermore, the model correctly predicts that the average scale of production should rise with the quality of enforcement. Finally, we find that the importance of l...
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作者：van der Ploeg, Frederick
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Amsterdam
摘要：I analyze a power struggle where competing factions have private financial assets and deplete a common stock of natural resources with no private property rights. I obtain a feedback Nash equilibrium to the dynamic common-pool problem and obtain political variants of the Hotelling depletion rule and the Hartwick saving rule. Resource prices and depletion occur too fast, so substitution away from resources to capital occurs too fast and the saving rate is too high. The power struggle boosts out...
