VORACIOUS TRANSFORMATION OF A COMMON NATURAL RESOURCE INTO PRODUCTIVE CAPITAL

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van der Ploeg, Frederick
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00583.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 365-381
• 关键词: Intergenerational equity; depletion; GROWTH; rents; path; RULE

摘要

I analyze a power struggle where competing factions have private financial assets and deplete a common stock of natural resources with no private property rights. I obtain a feedback Nash equilibrium to the dynamic common-pool problem and obtain political variants of the Hotelling depletion rule and the Hartwick saving rule. Resource prices and depletion occur too fast, so substitution away from resources to capital occurs too fast and the saving rate is too high. The power struggle boosts output, but depresses sustainable consumption. Genuine saving is nevertheless zero in a fractionalized society. World Bank estimates may be too optimistic.