LIMITED ENFORCEMENT, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Amaral, Pedro S.; Quintin, Erwan
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Dallas
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00601.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 785-811
• 关键词: Occupational choice; GROWTH; PRODUCTIVITY; MODEL

摘要

We present a model of economic development where the importance of financial differences caused by limited enforcement can be measured. Economies where enforcement is poor direct less capital to the production sector and employ less efficient technologies. Calibrated simulations reveal that the resulting effect on output is large. Furthermore, the model correctly predicts that the average scale of production should rise with the quality of enforcement. Finally, we find that the importance of limited enforcement rises with the importance of capital in production.