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作者：Magruder, Jeremy R.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Big Push models suggest that local product demand can create multiple labor market equilibria: one featuring high wages, formalization, and high demand and one with low wages, informality, and low demand. I demonstrate that minimum wages may coordinate development at the high wage equilibrium. Using data from 1990s Indonesia, where minimum wages increased in a varied way, I develop a difference in spatial differences estimator which weakens the common trend assumption of difference in differen...
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作者：Andersen, Jorgen Juel; Aslaksen, Silje
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：Political economy theories on the natural resource curse predict that natural resource wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in office. Whether resource wealth leads to longer or shorter durations in political office depends on the political incentives created by the natural resources, which in turn depend on the types of institutions and natural resource. Exploiting a sample of more than 600 political leadership durations in up to 152 countries, we...
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作者：Demir, Firat
作者单位：University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman
摘要：Employing a firm-level dataset, this paper explores the effects of exchange rate volatility on the growth performances of domestic versus foreign, and publicly traded versus non-traded private manufacturing firms in a major developing country, Turkey. The empirical results using dynamic panel data estimation techniques and comprehensive robustness tests suggest that exchange rate volatility has a significant growth reducing effect on manufacturing firms. However, having access to foreign, and ...
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作者：Koessler, Frederic; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：This paper studies firms' incentives to commit to transparent behavior in a competitive procedure modeled as an asymmetric information beauty contest managed by a corrupt agent. In his evaluation affirms' offers for a public contract the agent has some discretion to favor a firm in exchange for a bribe. While unilateral commitment to transparency is never incentive compatible, under some circumstances a voluntary but conditional commitment mechanism can eliminate corruption. A low quality firm...
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作者：Frankel, Jeffrey A.; Vegh, Carlos A.; Vuletin, Guillermo
作者单位：Harvard University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Colby College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In the past, industrial countries have tended to pursue countercyclical or, at worst, acyclical fiscal policy. In sharp contrast, emerging and developing countries have followed procyclical fiscal policy, thus exacerbating the underlying business cycle. We show that, over the last decade, about a third of the developing world has been able to escape the procyclicality trap and actually become countercyclical. We then focus on the role played by the quality of institutions, which appears to be ...
