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作者:Kragl, Jenny; Schoettner, Anja
作者单位:European Business School (EBS) University; University of Konstanz
摘要:We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however, induces the principal to dismiss one agent or to even exclude tasks from the production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking, but may increase profit under spec...
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作者:Eichberger, Juergen; Kelsey, David
作者单位:Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of Exeter
摘要:This article considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations. It extends the existing literature on games with ambiguity-averse players by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity. We use the CEU model of ambiguity with a class of capacities introduced by Jaffrray and Philippe (Mathematics of Operations Research 22 (1997), 165-85), which allows us to distinguish ambiguity from ambiguity-attitude, and propose a new solution concept, equilibrium under ambiguity (EUA), for players...
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作者:Ritschl, Albrecht; Sarferaz, Samad
作者单位:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要:During the 1920s, Germany was the world's largest capital importer, financing reparations through U.S. credits. We examine financial channels in crisis transmission between these two countries around the German financial crisis of 1931. We specify a structural dynamic factor model to identify financial and monetary factors separately for each of the two economies. We find substantial crisis transmission from Germany to the United States via the financial channel, while monetary or financial cr...
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作者:Esteban-Pretel, Julen; Fujimoto, Junichi
作者单位:National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies; University of Tokyo
摘要:In the United States, unemployment, job finding, and separation rates decline as worker age increases. To explain these facts, we build a search and matching model of the labor market that incorporates a life-cycle structure and features random match quality as well as human capital accumulation. The calibrated model successfully reproduces the empirical patterns of unemployment and job transition rates over the life cycle and generates plausible wage implications. We then explore the efficien...
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作者:Netzer, Nick; Scheuer, Florian
作者单位:University of Zurich; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:We construct an extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. It allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross-subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists. In fact, when withdrawal is costless, the set of equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts. We then focus on robust e...
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作者:Chen, Ying; Olszewski, Wojciech
作者单位:University of Southampton; Johns Hopkins University; Northwestern University
摘要:Do elementary statistics or equilibrium theory deliver any insight regarding how we should argue in debates? We provide an answer in a model in which each discussant wants to convince the audience that a specific state holds. If the discussants' payoffs in the audience's posterior are concave above and convex below the prior and exhibit loss aversion, then the leading discussant should give precedence to the weaker argument, and the follower should respond to a weak argument weakly and to a st...
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作者:Strulik, Holger
作者单位:University of Gottingen
摘要:This article proposes a theory for the gradual evolution of knowledge diffusion and growth over the very long run. A feedback mechanism between capital accumulation and the ease of knowledge diffusion explains a long epoch of stasis and an epoch of high growth linked by a gradual economic takeoff. The feedback mechanism can explain the Great Divergence, the failure of less developed countries to attract capital from abroad, and the productivity slowdown. An extension toward a two-region world ...
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作者:Mandler, Michael
作者单位:University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要:How robust are economic models to the introduction of irrational agents? The Pareto efficiency of competitive equilibria is not robust since one irrational agent leads to inefficiency. But the property that rational agents cannot use their own resources to Pareto improve on their competitive allocation holds regardless of the number of irrational agents. Full production efficiency can be robust as well, but irrational firms introduce a trade-off between efficiency and the attainment of Pareto ...
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作者:Campbell, Jeffrey R.; Eden, Benjamin
作者单位:Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Tilburg University; Vanderbilt University
摘要:This article uses weekly scanner data from two small U.S. cities to characterize time and state dependence of grocers' pricing decisions. In these data, the probability of a nominal adjustment declines with the time since the last price change. A store's price for a particular product typically goes through several price changes in rapid succession before settling down. We also detect state dependence: The probability of a nominal adjustment is highest when a store's price substantially differ...
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作者:Mitchener, J. K.; Yan, S.