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作者：Li, Wenli; Liu, Haiyong; Yang, Fang; Yao, Rui
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of North Carolina; East Carolina University; Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：We construct a model of optimal life-cycle housing and nonhousing consumption and estimate the elasticity between the two goods to be 0.487. The estimate is robust to different assumptions of housing adjustment cost, but sensitive to the choice of sample period and the degree of aggregation of data moments. We then conduct experiments in which house prices and household income fluctuate. Compared with the benchmark, the impact of the shocks on homeownership rates is reduced, but the impact on ...
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作者：Morris, Stephen; Shin, Hyun Song
作者单位：Princeton University; Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
摘要：We provide a theoretical decomposition of bank credit risk into insolvency risk and illiquidity risk, defining illiquidity risk to be the counterfactual probability of failure due to a run when the bank would have survived in the absence of a run. We show that illiquidity risk is (i) decreasing in the liquidity ratiothe ratio of realizable cash on the balance sheet to short-term liabilities; (ii) decreasing in the excess return of debt; and (iii) increasing in the solvency uncertaintya measure...
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作者：Tsuyuhara, Kunio
作者单位：University of Calgary
摘要：This article proposes a model with dynamic incentive contracts and on-the-job search in a frictional labor market. The optimal long-term contract exhibits an increasing wage-tenure profile. With increasing wages, worker effort also increases with tenure. These two features imply that the probabilities of both voluntary and involuntary job separation decrease with both job tenure and the duration of employment. Given these results, workers experience differing labor market transitionsbetween em...
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作者：Stacey, Derek
作者单位：Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：I propose a search model of a decentralized market with asymmetric information in which sellers are unable to commit to asking prices announced ex ante. Relaxing the commitment assumption prevents sellers from using price posting as a signaling device to direct buyers' search. Private information about the gains from trade and inefficient entry on the demand side then contribute to market illiquidity. Endogenous sorting among costly marketing platforms can facilitate the search process by segm...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This article investigates how helping behavior can be sustained in large societies in the presence of agents who never help. I consider a game with many players who are anonymously and randomly matched every period in pairs. Within each match, one player may provide socially optimal but individually costly help to the other player. I introduce and characterize the class of linear equilibria in which, unlike equilibria used in the previous literature, there is help even in the presence of behav...
