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作者：Ju, Heng; Tan, Guofu
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Southern California
摘要：We develop models of bilateral oligopoly with traffic exchanges to study the competition and regulatory policies in the international telephone markets. Under the requirement of uniform settlement rates, the proportional return rule (PRR) inflates the rates and hence neutralizes PRR's effect on calling prices. Retail competition and PRR increase net settlement payments. Market efficiency is improved when there are multiple channels for traffic exchanges. Using a panel of 47 countries that exch...
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作者：Fleurbaey, Marc; Leroux, Marie-Louise; Pestieau, Pierre; Ponthiere, Gregory
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Liege; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universite Paris-Est-Creteil-Val-de-Marne (UPEC); Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime and compare the laissez-faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected lifetime welfare, allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies, and (2) the maximin on realized lifetime welfare, allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter optimu...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This article investigates how helping behavior can be sustained in large societies in the presence of agents who never help. I consider a game with many players who are anonymously and randomly matched every period in pairs. Within each match, one player may provide socially optimal but individually costly help to the other player. I introduce and characterize the class of linear equilibria in which, unlike equilibria used in the previous literature, there is help even in the presence of behav...
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作者：Perez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We study contests with private information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities. The designer's revenue depends on the quality of the output, and she offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes, and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive conditions under which the designer...
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作者：Jaworski, Taylor; Kimbrough, Erik O.
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Simon Fraser University
摘要：In laboratory asset markets, subjects trade shares of a firm whose profits in a linked product market determine dividends. Treatments vary whether dividend information is revealed once per period or in real time and whether the firm is controlled by a profit-maximizing robot or human subject. The latter variation induces uncertainty about firm behavior, bridging the gap between laboratory and field markets. Our data replicate well-known features of laboratory asset markets (e.g., bubbles), sug...
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作者：Giacomini, Raffaella; Rossi, Barbara
作者单位：University of London; University College London; ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI)
摘要：The goal of this article is to develop formal tests to evaluate the relative in-sample performance of two competing, misspecified, nonnested models in the presence of possible data instability. Compared to previous approaches to model selection, which are based on measures of global performance, we focus on the local relative performance of the models. We propose tests that are based on different measures of local performance and that correspond to different null and alternative hypotheses. Th...
