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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Zhou, Yu
作者单位：Maastricht University; Kyoto University
摘要：We consider a matching with contracts model in which buyers face financial constraints. In this model, a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist. We therefore propose the new notion of quantity-constrained competitive equilibrium (QCCE). At a QCCE, buyers form expectations about the expected supply of trades. A buyer may expect that a trade is not to be supplied if the corresponding financial constraint is binding. We show the existence of QCCEs via a dynamic process that updates prices and ...
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作者：Naeher, Dominik
作者单位：University of Gottingen
摘要：A new explanation for imperfect technology adoption is proposed. In the model, agents allocate scarce attention rationally between actions and decide whether and how to adopt a technology. Introducing constraints to information processing gives rise to attentional barriers to technology adoption, which affect optimal adoption behavior. The model can explain why individuals (i) fail to adopt profitable technologies, (ii) fail to make the best use of adopted technology, (iii) treat complementary...
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作者：Liu, Andrew Yizhou
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
摘要：This article quantifies the effect of minimum wages on workers' occupational mobility. I show that minimum wages decrease younger, less-educated workers' occupational mobility and are associated with more mismatch. A search-and-matching model highlights two channels by which the minimum wage decreases occupational mobility. First, it compresses wages and reduces the gain from switching, leading to lower occupational mobility and more mismatch. Second, it decreases vacancy posting. Calibrating ...
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作者：Li, Yunan; Wang, Cheng
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Fudan University
摘要：We offer a new way of thinking about labor market fluctuations. In a perfectly stationary physical environment of the labor market, moral hazard and competition in long-term contracting generate cycles in market tightness, which may induce job creation and destruction, and two-period and longer cycles in wages and employment. Long-term contracts use termination as an incentive device. Underlying the cycles is an intertemporal negative externality. In prescribing a larger (smaller) probability ...
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作者：Grant, Iris; Kesternich, Iris; Van Biesebroeck, Johannes
作者单位：KU Leuven
摘要：Demand for long-term care services is growing strongly. Using a rich administrative data set for Germany, we examine strategic interaction between nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes. The estimated competitive effects imply that competition is much stronger within type, suggesting that they provide differentiated products. Over time, the entry behavior of for-profit homes has converged to that of the more established nonprofits and between-type competition has become stronger. Counterfactua...
