ENTRY DECISIONS AND ASYMMETRIC COMPETITION BETWEEN NONPROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT HOMES IN THE LONG-TERM CARE MARKET

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grant, Iris; Kesternich, Iris; Van Biesebroeck, Johannes
• 署名单位: KU Leuven
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12544
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 631-670
• 关键词: quality-of-care; spillovers; mergers; prices; CHOICE

摘要

Demand for long-term care services is growing strongly. Using a rich administrative data set for Germany, we examine strategic interaction between nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes. The estimated competitive effects imply that competition is much stronger within type, suggesting that they provide differentiated products. Over time, the entry behavior of for-profit homes has converged to that of the more established nonprofits and between-type competition has become stronger. Counterfactual simulations of proposed changes in government policy indicate that even moderate changes have a large impact on the fraction of markets that remain unserved or only served by a single type.