COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN MATCHING MODELS WITH FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Zhou, Yu
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; Kyoto University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12550
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 777-802
• 关键词: Auctions; STABILITY; networks

摘要

We consider a matching with contracts model in which buyers face financial constraints. In this model, a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist. We therefore propose the new notion of quantity-constrained competitive equilibrium (QCCE). At a QCCE, buyers form expectations about the expected supply of trades. A buyer may expect that a trade is not to be supplied if the corresponding financial constraint is binding. We show the existence of QCCEs via a dynamic process that updates prices and quantity constraints, the equivalence between QCCE outcomes and stable outcomes, and some other properties of QCCEs like the lattice property.