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作者：Guertler, Oliver; Struth, Lennart
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：Wage transparency rules arguably enable workers better to assess their contribution to firm value, allowing them to make wage demands that more accurately reflect their value for the employing firm. This article contains a formal analysis of transparency rules and their effects on wages and the payoffs of the targeted workers. We find that these rules induce firms to behave strategically with the aim of manipulating the information workers receive. We identify a large class of rules that yield...
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作者：Di Casola, Paola; Sichlimiris, Spyridon
作者单位：European Central Bank; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We develop a model that features costly market segmentation and financial repression to link domestic and external sovereign debt with default. In a financially repressed economy, a government that exploits its market power in the domestic economy can also increase its external debt capacity, owing to a novel, additional endogenous cost of default. A government forfeits the gains from trading in segmented debt markets when it defaults. Among other empirical regularities, our model can account ...
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作者：Herrera, Helios; Mace, Antonin; Nunez, Matias
作者单位：University of Warwick; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：We study how do-or-die threats ending negotiations affect gridlock and welfare when two opposing parties bargain. Failure to agree on a deal in any period implies a continuation of the negotiation. However, under brinkmanship, agreement failure in any period may precipitate a crisis with a small chance. In equilibrium, such brinkmanship threats improve the probability of an agreement, but also increase the risk of crisis. Brinkmanship reduces welfare when one might think it is most needed: sev...
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作者：Duffy, John; Orland, Andreas
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Osaka; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：We test the buffer stock model of savings behavior using a three-period intertemporal model. In one treatment, liquidity in the second period is constrained (borrowing not possible), while the unconstrained treatment has no such constraint. The buffer stock model predicts that a second-period liquidity constraint increases first-period savings. We also vary the variance of stochastic income (high or low) in a 2x2$2 \times 2$ design. While we find no evidence for the predicted liquidity constra...
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作者：Peretto, Pietro F.; Valente, Simone
作者单位：Duke University; Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU)
摘要：Pollution causes premature deaths but plays almost no role in macroeconomic analysis. To fill this gap, we build a tractable model of innovation-led economic growth and endogenous fertility in which production generates deadly spillovers, that is, emissions that increase mortality. Such spillovers affect income growth, population size, and welfare. They also create steady states that would not exist otherwise. Emission taxes increase population size and may even raise long-run growth if they r...
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作者：Di Nola, Alessandro; Kocharkov, Georgi; Scholl, Almuth; Tkhir, Anna-Mariia; Wang, Haomin
作者单位：University of Birmingham; University of Konstanz; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Allianz SE; Cardiff University
摘要：We examine the aggregate and distributional effects of raising the top marginal income tax rate in the presence of entrepreneurial tax avoidance. In a model with heterogeneous agents and occupational choice, entrepreneurs can avoid taxes by choosing the legal form of business organization and shifting income across tax bases. Applied to the U.S. economy, we find that tax avoidance weakens the distortionary effects of higher income taxes at the top but makes them ineffective at lowering inequal...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Hu, Gaoji; Yang, Xiangqian
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Hunan University
摘要：We study information design in a single-agent allocation problem with costly verification, where the principal has a positive reservation value. The agent learns privately a signal about the principal's allocation value, drawn from a distribution controlled by an information designer. Given the signal distribution, the principal designs a mechanism to maximize her net value. We show that the agent-optimal information pools high values at a signal just worth verification, whereas the principal-...
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作者：Herrera, Helios; Mace, Antonin; Nunez, Matias
作者单位：University of Warwick; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We study how do-or-die threats ending negotiations affect gridlock and welfare when two opposing parties bargain. Failure to agree on a deal in any period implies a continuation of the negotiation. However, under brinkmanship, agreement failure in any period may precipitate a crisis with a small chance. In equilibrium, such brinkmanship threats improve the probability of an agreement, but also increase the risk of crisis. Brinkmanship reduces welfare when one might think it is most needed: sev...
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作者：Di Casola, Paola; Sichlimiris, Spyridon
作者单位：European Central Bank; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We develop a model that features costly market segmentation and financial repression to link domestic and external sovereign debt with default. In a financially repressed economy, a government that exploits its market power in the domestic economy can also increase its external debt capacity, owing to a novel, additional endogenous cost of default. A government forfeits the gains from trading in segmented debt markets when it defaults. Among other empirical regularities, our model can account ...
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作者：Bastani, Spencer; Blumkin, Tomer; Micheletto, Luca
作者单位：Uppsala University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; University of Milan
摘要：We develop a theory of optimal income and education taxation under asymmetric information between firms and workers. Our results show that a max-min optimal tax code can achieve predistribution by pooling wages across ability levels, conditional on income. We identify conditions under which the optimal solution leads to pooling or separating equilibria, highlighting bidirectional incentive constraints. Implementation requires nonlinear income taxes coupled with education subsidies or mandates....
