DO WORKERS BENEFIT FROM WAGE TRANSPARENCY RULES?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guertler, Oliver; Struth, Lennart
• 署名单位: University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12750
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1099-1128
• 关键词: gap evidence; probability; tax

摘要

Wage transparency rules arguably enable workers better to assess their contribution to firm value, allowing them to make wage demands that more accurately reflect their value for the employing firm. This article contains a formal analysis of transparency rules and their effects on wages and the payoffs of the targeted workers. We find that these rules induce firms to behave strategically with the aim of manipulating the information workers receive. We identify a large class of rules that yield an identical equilibrium outcome. For productivity distributions with decreasing (increasing) hazard rate, transparency rules increase (potentially decrease) workers' payoffs.