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作者:Loyola University Chicago; Northwestern University
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作者:Australian National University
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作者:Tufts University
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作者:Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University Kingsville
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作者:University of California System; University of California Berkeley
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作者:Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要:For long periods, and in line with recent theoretical literature, the rabassa morta sharecropping contract successfully reduced problems of moral hazard and opportunistic behavior, and provided incentives for sharecroppers to respond to market opportunities. However, from the late nineteenth century, technical change, rising wages, and weak wine prices all increased the incentives for postcontractual opportunistic behavior on the part of the sharecropper, leading to conflicts and loss of trust...
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作者:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
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作者:University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
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作者:University of Toronto
摘要:I examine prenuptial contracting behavior in early-nineteenth-century Quebec to explore property rights within families and the efficacy of marital property laws. Drawing on a transaction cost framework, I examine the decision to sign a contract and couples' property rights choices. I find, for example, that couples signing contracts tended to choose joint ownership of property when wives were particularly important to the household. These findings illustrate the potential effects of legal ins...
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作者:Williams College
摘要:Corporate groups have been very important in the economies of many developing countries, including prewar Japan, where zaibatsu controlled approximately one-third of the capital stock. Regression analysis of a new firm-lever financial data set distinguishes the economic behavior of zaibatsu member firms from independent firms. The only significant difference between old-zaibatsu member firms and independent firms is that some measures of earnings of old zaibatsu were less stable. The earnings ...